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INTRODUCTION
¶1

History has proven that the property rights 1 regime has a significant part to play in
shaping the destiny of a nation. 2 Scholars and jurists have suggested that property rights
are essential for freedom to be enjoyed in its truest sense. 3 Perhaps, therefore, laws
protecting property rights have been hailed as “the noblest triumph of humanity over
itself.” 4 Institutions protecting property rights are a consequence of the technological
advancement and evolution of society. 5 It comes as no surprise, therefore, that they have
*

Student, National University of Juridical Sciences, India.
Student, National University of Juridical Sciences, India. The authors would like to thank Professor
Shubha Ghosh of Southern Methodist University for his insights on the paper. The ideas in the study have
benefited from discussions with Chanakya Arora, Satya Prateek, and Surya Bala, students at the National
University of Juridical Sciences, India. We dedicate this paper to our guru, Professor M.P. Singh, Vice
Chancellor, National University of Juridical Sciences, India.
1
See, e.g., ARMEN A. ALCHIAN, ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK 130 (1977) (“A property right for me
means some protection against other people’s choosing against my will one of the uses of resources, said to
be ‘mine.’”).
2
See, e.g., Gerald P. O'Driscoll Jr. & Lee Hoskins, Property Rights: The Key to Economic Development,
482 LAW & ECON DEV. 1, 2 (2006) (discussing why there was such disparity in the economic condition of
various countries despite having similar cultures, resources, and history); Allan H. Meltzer, The Irving
Kristol Lecture of the American Enterprise Institute: Leadership and Progress (Feb. 26, 2003) (transcript
available at http://www2.tepper.cmu.edu/afs/andrew/gsia/meltzer/US_leader_progress.doc) (“In each of
these comparisons, culture, language, and traditions are the same. Outcomes are markedly different. The
countries with capitalist institutions and market system grew richer; the others faltered or went
backwards.”).
3
See Timothy B. Lewis, Constitutional Freedom Foundation, Property Rights (June 6, 2004),
http://www.constitutionalfreedomfoundation.org/Articles/constitutional_primer_7.htm (“The first and chief
design of every system of government is to maintain justice: to prevent the members of society from
encroaching on one another’s property, or seizing what is not their own. The design here is to give each
one the secure and peaceable possession of his own property.”); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO
SERFDOM 103-04 (1944) (“The system of private property is the most important guaranty of freedom, not
only for those who do not. It is only because the control of production is divided among many people
acting independently that nobody has complete power over us, that we as individuals can decide what to do
with ourselves. If all the means of production were vested in a single hand, whether it be nominally that of
‘society’ as a whole or that of a dictator, whoever exercises this control has complete power over us.”).
4
O'Driscoll & Hoskins, supra note 2, at 19 (“Jeremy Bentham who disagreed with Blackstone on
various accounts, agreed with the jurist on property, saying that the law securing property is ‘the noblest
triumph of humanity over itself.’”(citing TOM BETHELL, THE NOBLEST TRIUMPH: PROPERTY AND
PROSPERITY THROUGH THE AGES 19, 100 (1998))); see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, EHRLICH’S
BLACKSTONE 113 (J. W. Ehrlich ed., 1959).
5
Boudewijn Bouckaert, Original Assignment of Private Property, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 2 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000) (suggesting that property rights are a
consequence of the evolutionary process involving a transition from an institutionless and ruleless open
**
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been around for centuries in one form or another. 6 Economic theory indicates that early
property rights existed in the form of “common property” and it was later that private
property rights emerged. 7 The majority of economists consider private property rights as
an essential “ingredient in economic development.” 8 They argue that a clearly defined
private property right reduces the incentive to free ride and ensures that the costs 9 and
benefits arising from the exercise of that right accrue solely to the owner. 10 Moreover,
economists with reasonable success have established that the degree of investment in a
particular asset is strongly related to the degree of protection of that asset. 11 Economists
have likewise established that the resources available for investment and their allocation
eventually determine the wealth generated by an individual or an enterprise. 12 A

access situation towards an ordered and complex system involving administrative, policing and
adjudicative institutions system of rights); see also O'Driscoll & Hoskins, supra note 2, at 445 (“It is a
mistake to assume that the task of assigning, defining and protecting property rights is the exclusive job of
the state. Property developed from traditions and customs long before we had nations.”); see generally
HENRY SUMMER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW; IN CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS
RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS (1963), available at
http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/maine/anclaw/chap06 (relying on both his research in
India and the work of European scholars on primitive societal setups as well as the conceptual origins of
property to suggest that it originated from joint, not separate, ownership); RICHARD STROUP, Free-Market
Environmentalism, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, available at
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/EnvironmentalismFreeMarket.html; Terry Anderson and Peter J. Hill,
The Race for Property Rights, 33 J.L & ECON. 177, 177-98 (1990) (highlighting the fact that the plains in
America lost their status as commons and eventually were privatized); STEVEN SHAVELL, Economic
Analysis of Property Law, CH. 7, at 11 Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper No. 399 (2002), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/399.pdf.
6
See RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 65 (1999) (discussing the manner in which institutions
protecting property rights evolved from ancient times to the emergence of the state); See generally Martin.
J. Bailey, Property Rights in Aboriginal Societies, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW 155-57 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Robert M. Netting, What Alpine Peasants Have in
Common: Observations on Communal Tenure in a Swiss Village, 4(2) HUMAN ECOLOGY 135-146 (1976)
(suggesting that the attribution of resources often determines the kind of property rights regime regulating
their use and citing the example of communities in Switzerland where peasants followed separate
ownership property rights model for agricultural land compared to a communal property model for alpine
hillside grazing grounds); see also Elinor Ostrom, Private and Common Property Rights, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 332, 346 (Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000)
(recognizing that similar systems have existed in Norway for centuries.).
7
See MAINE, supra note 5, Ostrom, supra note 6; See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land,
102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993) (highlighting that property rights often emerge out of a need for efficient
resource allocation or to minimize risks).
8
Ostrom, supra note 6, at 334.
9
Harold Demstez, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 (1967) (asserting
that in absence of a property rights regime all costs incurred by society in production of a good may not be
internalized in the price of the good produced).
10
See Ostrom, supra note 6, at 334.
11
See Thomas J. Miceli, Property, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 121 (Enrico
Colombatto ed., 2005) (“[T]he economic approach to property rights emphasizes its role in promoting
efficient allocation of resources. Accomplishing this goal generally involves creation and protection of
individual rights in property so as to encourage exchange and investment . . . .”); see also Simon Johnson
et al., Property Rights and Finance, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1335 (2002) (using some post-communist countries
as examples that secure property rights are essential for investment); see generally Timothy Besley,
Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana, 103 J. POL. ECON. 903
(1995) (relating property rights to investment incentives and discussing land ownership by farmers in
Ghana).
12
See Stijn Claessens & Luc Laeven, Financial Development, Property Rights, and Growth 4-32 (World
Bank Fin. Sector Strategy and Pol. Dep’t, Pol’y Res. Working Paper No. 2924, 2002).
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corollary of this suggests that in the absence of an efficient property rights regime, an
individual or enterprise may be forced to invest in practices which are less productive
than others. 13 In application of these principles, property rights can be understood as
rules that determine how individuals or enterprises gain access to resources, the manner
in which they utilize them, and the net benefit that can be expected out of them. Hence, it
can be concluded that allocation of property rights leads to the creation of incentives,
which encourages efficient resource exploitation.14
Furthermore, another factor that influences resource allocation is the nature of
goods. 15 Studies have indicated that in the absence of a property rights regime, firms
tend to invest in tangible goods rather than intangible goods because it is easier for a firm
to protect the former compared to the latter.16 Hence, property rights matter more for
protection of intangible goods as compared to tangible goods. 17 Drawing from above, it
is evident that in the case of extremely weak 18 or a complete lack of protection of
intellectual property (IP), firms would refrain from investing in research and development
of IP, thereby, considerably reducing the rate of growth in IP. 19

See SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 2-12.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 36 (5th ed. 1998); see also Lee Hoskins &
Ana I. Eiras, Property Rights: The Key to Economic Growth, in 2002 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM 37-38
(Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr. et al. eds., 2002) (“More generally, the stronger the set of property rights, the
stronger the incentive to work, save, and invest, and the more effective the operation of the economy. The
more effectively an economy operates, the more growth it will produce for any set of resources.”).
15
Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and Technology
Transfer (Int’l Fin. Corp. & World Bank, Discussion Paper No. 19, 1994) (indicating a relationship
between property rights and resource allocation in intangible and tangible assets) [hereinafter Intellectual
Property Protection]; Edwin Mansfield, Unauthorized Use of Intellectual Property: Effects on Investment,
Technology Transfer, and Innovation, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 107, 145 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) (highlighting the effect of a
weak IPR regime in Latin American countries).
16
One of the reasons is that “intangible goods” can be copied and reproduced at a very low cost.
Claessens & Laeven, supra note 12, at 4-6. See also Intellectual Property Protection, supra note 15.
17
See Claessens & Laeven, supra note 12, at 6 (indicating that one of the factors resulting in low degree
of investment in intangible goods may be a weak property rights regime.). See also Intellectual Property
Protection, supra note 15.
18
By a weak protection we imply that the legal regime provides a narrow scope and short duration of
protection. For instance, a regime grants monopoly rights only for process patents or which grants product
patent for an extremely short duration of time. For comments and analysis of strong and weak patent
regimes in India, see for example, Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation
of India’s Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491 (2007);
Carsten Fink, How Stronger Patent Protection in India might affect the Behavior of Transnational
Pharmaceutical Industries (The World Bank Development Research Group, Working Paper No. 2352,
2000), available at
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/Research/workpapers.nsf/bd04ac9da150d30385256815005076ce/5d9b6
7dfa0777405852568e80065f3c4/$FILE/wps2352.pdf.
19
Model I: Y > 0, X > Y, B > A (since the duration of monopoly in the market would be longer). A is
the profit accruing due to the monopoly enjoyed due to the time taken by competitors to copy the
innovation. B is the profit due to protection which would vary with the scope and duration of the
intellectual property regime.
13
14

Nature of Regime

Cost of Time and Labor

Expected Benefit

Output

No Protection

X

Y+A

If Y + A > X

Protection

X

Y +B

If Y + B > X
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The discussion above indicates that property rights are important for efficient
resource allocation, and given the nature of intangible goods, property rights are even
more important for spurring innovation. This would naturally lead to the debate
regarding the optimal scope and duration of protection of IP. This paper, however, shall
not delve into that issue. 20
The aim of this paper is to argue against the uniform protection afforded to all
kinds of innovations under the present patent system. This paper proposes that
innovations can be divided into two groups. The first group consists of innovations
which do not hinder the use of existing and future innovations and the second group
consists of those innovations which may hinder the use of existing and future
innovations. Thus, while protection of innovations in the first group may result in a
Pareto superior move, the same cannot be said about innovations of the second group.
There may be various inventions that would fall in the second category; however,
we shall focus on drugs, such as antibiotics, antivirals and other similar pharmaceuticals.
We argue that the consumption of these drugs and the consequent development of
resistance in pathogens due to cross-resistance impose a negative externality upon the
society. Under the current IP regime, this externality is not internalized. Recognizing
that cross-resistance is inevitable, we suggest that the detrimental effect of this externality
can be offset by ensuring greater access to such drugs.
Part I of this paper, after analyzing relevant aspects of Locke’s theory, goes on to
argue that even though protection of most forms of IP is a Pareto superior move,
protection of drugs, such as antibiotics, antivirals and other related pharmaceuticals, may
not always be a Pareto superior move. Part II establishes that cross-resistance hinders
the use of existing and future drugs. Further, this part discusses competitive market
theory and argues that the cost of cross-resistance needs to be internalized. In Part III, we
shall conclude by averring that a homogenous patent protection under the Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights is unreasonable (TRIPs). Finally,
we shall suggest that appropriate changes should be made in the patent protection system
in order to internalize the cost of cross-resistance.
I. INTERPRETING LOCKE’S THEORY AND UNDERSTANDING CROSS-RESISTANCE

¶7

According to Locke, people had natural rights that belonged to all humans from
birth. The right to property was one such right. Locke argued that if a person mixed his
labor with a common resource then that person had a legitimate right to claim it as his
21

It may be deduced from the above table that in the case of no protection, a rational individual, upon
comparing the cost and benefit that accrue to him/her, would decide not to invest labor and intellect into the
manifestation of an idea. As a consequence, a socially desirable creation or invention may not be created.
However, in case of a regime protecting the creation, the probability of the invention being created
increases, and hence, society may not be deprived of the invention.
20
See Ankur Sood & Vardaan Ahluwalia, Property Rights and Investment Incentives in Intellectual
Property: An Inter-disciplinary Approach, 1 NAT’L U. OF JURID. SCIS. L. REV. 69, 74 (2008) (addressing the
issue as to what is the right choice in the context of developing countries; a strong intellectual property
regime as advocated by the adherents of TRIPS or a weak intellectual property regime such as a patent
regime with a narrower scope and duration of protection.).
21
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ¶ 27 (“For this labour being the
unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at
least where there is enough and as good left in common for others.”).
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own. While Locke accepted this right, according to him, this right was subject to a precondition that there was “enough and as good left in common for others.” 22 Scholars
have interpreted Locke’s second condition 23 to mean that acquisition of property is
permissible where the same constitutes a Pareto superior move. 24 They argue that Locke
justified his stand on the right to acquire property by emphasizing that a person’s right
over property, which previously belonged to nature, should be respected because it is his
labor which gives him a claim far superior than the rest. They add that Locke argued that
since the same source was available to every other person, such other has no right to
object to its acquisition. Borrowing from the same, scholars have argued that the
creator’s title over IP is justified since every other person had access to the same
knowledge base from which it was created. 25 They emphasize that ownership and
consequent protection of IP by its creator is reasonable because “it makes the creator
better off without depriving anyone else of anything to which he or she had prior access
and use.” 26
While accepting this idea, an exception is sought to be established in the case of
antibiotics, antivirals, and other related pharmaceuticals.27 The basic argument in this
regard proceeds from Locke’s twin criterion 28 for acquisition of property. The first
See Id.
See Id.
24
A move from one distribution point to another is said to be superior when at least one party is better
off and no one else is worse off. (This includes moves that benefit all parties; the essential concern is that
no one is worse off after the move compared to welfare before the move.). See generally Microeconomic
Lecture Notes, http://www.calbaptist.edu/dskubik/pareto.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
25
See ADAM MOORE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION CONTROL: PHILOSOPHIC
FOUNDATIONS AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, 8 (Transaction Publishing/Rutgers University ed., 2001)
(2004) (“First, intellectual works are non-rivalrous, meaning that they can be created, possessed, owned,
and consumed by many individuals concurrently. Second, including allowances for independent creation, I
argue that the frontier of intellectual property is practically infinite. Locke hints at this kind of practical
infinity when he writes, ‘Nobody could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he
took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst . . . .’ If I am
correct, the case for Locke’s water-drinker and the author or inventor are quite alike.”).
26
Kenneth Himma, The Justification of Intellectual Property: Contemporary Philosophical Disputes,
BERKELEY CENTER FOR LAW & TECH., available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/bclt/lts/21. See also Adam
Moore, Privacy, Intellectual Property, and Hacking, in INTERNET SECURITY: HACKING, COUNTERHACKING,
AND SOCIETY 12 (Kenneth E. Himma ed., 2006) (“If no one is harmed by an acquisition and one person is
bettered, then the acquisition ought to be permitted. In fact, it is precisely because no one is harmed that it
seems unreasonable to object to what is known as a Pareto-superior move. Thus, the proviso can be
understood as a version of a “no harm, no foul” principle”).
27
Apart from above, other instances can be pointed out where the society may be worse off due to
granting of a patent. For instance, suppose that A is granted a patent on an extremely effective and useful
drug. Also, let us suppose that A decides to withhold the drug from society. Now, due to an exclusive
product patent, it can be said that potential consumers are worse-off because they have been denied the
opportunity to gain access to the invention. Not because A withholds the patent but because the fact that
the patent denies any other producer, who could have invented the same innovation, to make the product
available to society. Some may argue that this illustration is also an example where intellectual property
protection leaves society worse off. However, in this instance, we disagree because the invention does not
affect the performance of any other invention in real terms. Further, such behavior has been addressed by
the TRIPS regime through compulsory licensing and measures of a similar nature to reduce the incentive to
act in such a manner. On the other hand, perhaps we should question whether granting a patent to some
other person, who reinvents the drug, leaves society better off. Since the technology level in society would
remain the same, a socially optimal solution would be to adequately reduce the incentive for A to act in a
socially undesirable manner.
28
LOCKE, supra note 21; MOORE, supra note 25, at 117.
22
23

185

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

¶9

[2008

condition pertaining to “labor” is easily satisfied by most forms of IP. 29 With regard to
Locke’s second condition, it has been argued that most forms of IP protection satisfy this
condition because the use of newly created knowledge does not impede further use of
already existing knowledge and future innovations and because the frontiers of creation
of IP are infinite. 30
Taking cognizance of the ability of pathogens to develop resistance to drugs having
similar attack mechanisms, we find that antibiotics, antivirals and other similar
pharmaceuticals fail to satisfy Locke’s second condition. For instance, if a pathogen is
able to develop or acquire resistance to an antibiotic, then the pathogen becomes capable
of resisting any drug that attacks the pathogen using a similar mechanism. This
phenomenon is known as cross-resistance. 31 For this reason, we argue that, unlike other
forms of IP, 32 protection of innovations in such pharmaceuticals cannot always be
characterized as Pareto superior as it may impede further use of existing knowledge and
future knowledge. 33 The process of development of resistance and cross-resistance is
facilitated by the capability of pathogens to acquire resistance or cross-resistance through
vertical 34 and/or horizontal evolution. 35 Medicinal history is replete with such examples.
According to a recent finding:
LOCKE, supra note 21, ¶ 27. Some may argue that intellectual property may not always be a result of
“much” labor. For instance, a song or a poem may be created without much effort. See, e.g., Himma,
supra note 26, at 18. However, we argue that intellectual property is always the result of labor, either in the
form of the innovator’s earlier endeavors which provide him with the requisite inventive capability and/or
as present efforts directed solely towards the manifestation of an idea, for instance, Graham Bell’s
invention of the telephone while he was working to invent a more complex form of telegraph.
Furthermore, some may argue that the present patent regime fails to satisfy Locke’s first condition as well
since it fails to always reward labor. For instance, a person may independently labor and reinvent a product
which has already been patented. Nonetheless, we would like to highlight that according to Locke, a
person is entitled to a right in a common resource if he has improved it with his labor. In the context of
intellectual property, improvement can be equated as an addition to the existing knowledge base. Now, it is
a fact that reinventing a product is not an addition to a knowledge base unless the process of creation of
product is new. However, the debate whether a process or product patent should be granted is outside the
scope of this paper.
30
See MOORE, supra note 25, at 117. (“[I]ncluding allowances for independent creation, I argue that the
frontier of intellectual property is practically infinite.”).
31
BUTTERWORTHS MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1462 (1999) (“Acquired resistance of a bacterial strain
conferring simultaneous resistance to another anti-bacterial agent. It is an indication that two agents are
related and have basically similar action.”).
32
Id.
33
Aidsmap – Cross-resistance, http://www.aidsmap.com/en/docs/D17AFE98-FAA4-4128-84C653D88A735A95.asp (last visited May 19, 2008).
34
KENNETH TODAR, TODAR’S ONLINE BOOK OF BACTERIOLOGY (2006),
http://textbookofbacteriology.net/resantimicrobial.html (last visited May 19, 2008) (“Vertical evolution is
strictly a matter of Darwinian evolution driven by principles of natural selection: a spontaneous mutation in
the bacterial chromosome imparts resistance to a member of the bacterial population. In the selective
environment of the antibiotic, the wild type (non mutant) is killed and the resistant mutant is allowed to
grow and flourish. The mutation rate for most bacterial genes is approximately 10-8. This means that if a
bacterial population doubles from 108 cells to 2 x 108 cells, there is likely to be a mutant present for any
given gene. Since bacteria grow to reach population densities far in excess of 109 cells, such a mutant
could develop from a single generation during 15 minutes of growth.”).
35
Id. (“Horizontal evolution is the acquisition of genes for resistance from another organism. For
example, a streptomycete has a gene for resistance to streptomycin (its own antibiotic), but somehow that
gene escapes and gets into E. coli or Shigella. Or, more likely, some bacterium develops genetic resistance
through the process of mutation and selection and then donates these genes to some other bacterium
through one of several processes for genetic exchange that exist in bacteria.”). See, e.g., Ricki Lewis, The
29
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Single mutations or patterns of mutations in HIV can produce resistance to
several different anti-HIV drugs. This means that once resistance to one drug has
emerged, this HIV may also be resistant to drugs you haven't taken yet. . . .
Cross-resistance may affect all currently available anti-HIV drugs to a greater
or lesser extent. So resistance to one nucleoside analogue will affect your choice
of other nucleoside analogues, resistance to a non-nucleoside analogue (NNRTI)
drug will affect your choice of other NNRTIs, and resistance to a protease
inhibitor will affect your choice of other protease inhibitors. Resistance to a
fusion inhibitor seems likely to have implications for your chance of fusion
inhibitors in the future. New classes of anti-HIV drugs are in development, but
these too may well be affected by cross-resistance[.] 36

¶10

Broadly speaking, anti-HIV drugs can be divided into nucleotide analogues, nonnucleotide analogues, protease inhibitors and fusion inhibitors. Usage of any drug of a
nucleotide variety can, and usually does, result in mutation of the HIV, resulting in the
HIV becoming immune to the drug. The effect of the mutation of the HIV is often,
unfortunately, not restricted to that particular drug, but results in the HIV becoming
immune to a variety of other similar drugs as well. This result applies equally to
mutations produced by drugs classified as non-nucleotide analogues, protease inhibitors
and fusion inhibitors. Further, and perhaps even more importantly, a mutation produced
as a consequence of existing drugs can result in the HIV developing a resistance to drugs
that are not even in existence today. This is an instance of cross-resistance and clearly
demonstrates how the phenomenon results in Locke’s second condition not being
satisfied in the case of intellectual property protection for certain drugs.
¶11
Thus, due to cross-resistance, a cost in the form of a negative externality, 37 is being
imposed upon the society because the performance of an innovation (antibiotic or antiviral, fungicide or other related pharmaceuticals) is affected in real terms. 38 For example,
when I purchase a 28-inch television, my purchase would not force another to purchase a
28-inch television or to stop using his 14-inch television because my purchase would in
no manner affect the performance of his television in real terms. However, my usage of a
particular medicine might. Any cross-resistance developed by pathogens may regulate
the decision of another when he chooses a medicine since the performance of his
medicine may be affected in real terms. 39 Currently, if a patent were to be granted for the
Rise of Antibiotic-Resistant Infections, United States Food & Drug Administration,
http://www.fda.gov/Fdac/features/795_antibio.html (last visited May 19, 2008) (“[w]hen penicillin became
widely available during the second world war, it was a medical miracle, rapidly vanquishing the biggest
wartime killer--infected wounds . . . . But just four years after drug companies began mass-producing
penicillin in 1943, microbes began appearing that could resist it.”).
36
Aidsmap–Cross-resistance, supra note 34 (emphasis added).
37
OXFORD DICTIONARY ON ECONOMICS 169 (1997) (“A cost or benefit arising from any activity which
does not accrue to the person or organization carrying on the activity. External costs or diseconomies are
damage to other people or the environment, for example by radiation, river or air pollution, or noise which
does not have to be paid for by those carrying on the activity…”). See generally Shavell, supra note 5, ch.
10, at 1 (“One party’s action will be said to have an external effect−or to create an externality−if it
influences, or may influence with a probability, the well-being of another person, in comparison to some
standard of reference.”).
38
By real terms we imply material terms and not something intangible like, preference, etc. Also, this
innovation may be existing drugs whose efficiency is hampered by the mutation or drugs developed in the
future.
39
In the above example the behavior of the individual A is being regulated as if I was allotted a right
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drug and the 28-inch television, the scope and duration of a patent for both would be the
same. This demonstrates that the present IP regime does not internalize 40 the impact of
innovations which in real terms adversely affect the performance of existing and future 41
innovations. 42 This, coupled with the reduction in efficacy and the consequent denial of a
kind of drug or a whole group of drugs as an option for consumption or research and
development, imposes an unreasonable restraint upon society.
II. THE NEED TO INTERNALIZE THE COST OF CROSS –RESISTANCE
¶12

Some may choose to argue that cross-resistance is a natural process; hence, no
entity as such can be said to be liable for the effects of cross-resistance. While this is
true, it is equally true that there are certain factors, such as the production and
consumption of drugs, which initialize and can accelerate this natural process. The cited
examples only emphasize the effect of such factors.
¶13
The assertion that the cost of cross-resistance should be internalized is best
understood in the case of pollution control regimes. Regimes all over the world seek to
ensure that polluters take into account the impact of their actions upon others. 43 It must
be remembered that the characteristics which makes an element a polluting agent, for
example mercury, are its own natural characteristics. The question whether an element is
considered a polluting element is relatively determined and is often dependent upon the
nature of the entity in respect to which the element is being discussed.44 For instance, if a
factory, in a locality where human beings reside, discharges an element, which let us say,
after reacting with air or any other naturally occurring substance becomes poisonous, the
factory shall be held liable for the same and it cannot escape liability.45 The polluter is
held liable because he willingly deals with gases which have such capabilities naturally. 46
and hence, the individual had a duty to observe it.
40
OXFORD DICTIONARY ON ECONOMICS, supra note 38, at 246 (“internalizing externalities[:] Methods
of getting those producing external costs or benefits to take account of them in their decision-taking. This
is partly a question of information: once individuals or firms realize that their actions are causing external
costs . . . there is a disincentive to causing external damage if one is made to pay for it, by taxes on
activities causing external damage, or an obligation to compensate the victims . . . .”).
41
As is evident from the HIV drugs example above, there is a risk that due to cross-resistance the use of
future innovations may also be adversely affected.
42
To elucidate further, in the above example, my decision, whether as a consumer who consumes a drug
for curing disease or an innovator who earns a profit due to the consumption of his innovation, to derive
benefit from a drug’s consumption would not take into account the consequent impact of my actions on any
other person, who can be either a consumer or an innovator researching on a drug having a similar attack
mechanism.
43
In common law countries, pollution gives rise to cause of action in the tort of nuisance. See
RANTANLAL AND DHIRAJLAL, THE LAW OF TORT 407 (Guru Prasana Singh ed., 2006); see, e.g., India’s
Water (Prevention of Pollution and Control) Act 1974, Air (Prevention of Pollution and Control) Act 1981,
Environment Protection Act, 1986, Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991; see also Wood v. Wand, 3 Exch.
748 (1849); Pakkle v. A.P. Aiyaswami, A.I.R. Mad. 351 (1969) (usually polluters are made to pay taxes or
compensation to victims or are even jailed); see generally MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENVIRONMENT
138 (Michael Allaby ed., 1994) (“It is the aim of the polluter pays principle to require polluters to meet the
cost of avoiding polluting or remedying its effects, so internalizing the externalities.”).
44
For instance, some substances which are poisonous for human beings or in any manner reduce the net
wellbeing of the society.
45
For instance, according to the common law principle of Nuisance in Torts, every person is allowed to
reasonably exercise certain rights in things. See RANTANLAL AND DHIRAJLAL, supra note 45, at 601.
However, from an economic perspective, nuisance laws can be seen as rules which tend to internalize the
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The suggestion that that cost of cross-resistance should be internalized is further
complemented by the Competitive Market theory47 and economic theory which advocates
that when parties act in a self interested way and do not take into account the impact of
their actions upon others, legal rules and state intervention can be used to correct
behavior. 48 Hence, we argue that even though cross-resistance is a naturally occurring
phenomenon, entities which initiate the same should be made to internalize the cost
imposed on society.
III. CONCLUSION

¶15

But, who is to be held liable? Is it the consumers, the producers, 49 or both? After
all, in the case of pharmaceuticals, unlike the pollution example discussed above, the
cross-resistance process is not kick-started unless the drug is consumed by the consumer.
Simultaneously, it may be argued that, the producer should be held liable since here the
consumer does not have a choice but to consume the medicine. 50 Nonetheless, since the
information costs of determining the liability in such cases can be prohibitive, 51 perhaps
intervention of state through legal rules is justified. 52

cost of unreasonable exercise of one’s rights. It is no defense that all reasonable care was taken to prevent
it. See, e.g., Rapier v. London Ramways Co., 2 Ch. 588 (1893); Newsome v. Darton Urban District
Council, 1 All E.R. 79 (1938). This principle evolved into the doctrine of strict liability. Rylands v.
Fletcher, L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 279 (1866 ) ( “The rule of law is that the person who, for his own purpose, brings
on his land and collects and keeps anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril;
and if he does not do so is prima facie answerable for all damage which is the natural consequence of its
escape.”). In India, this was developed into a regime in which the polluter was held to be absolutely liable,
that is, the defenses to the doctrine of strict liability were not available. See M.C Mehta v. Union of India,
1 S.C.C. 395, 421 (1987) ( “Where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity
and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently
dangerous activity resulting, for example, in escape of toxic gas, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely
liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the
exceptions which operate vis-à-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule of Rylands v.
Fletcher . . . .”).
46
See M.C Mehta v. Union of India, 1 S.C.C. 395, 421 (1987).
47
See MITCHELL A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 88-90 (1989) (identifying
the Competative Market Theory as saying that over pricing or under pricing of goods is economically
inefficient and that if the costs of manufacturing a product are not fully internalized then the good is under
priced leading to over consumption of the product).
48
See Shavell, supra note 5, Ch. 9, at 16 (arguing that state intervention into the sale of property which
causes harmful external effects directly or indirectly to other people is essential and justified since it is
socially beneficial, and arguing that state intervention is reasonable in instances where other methods, such
as liability may not perform satisfactorily).
49
By “producers” we mean the whole pharmaceutical industry.
50
Here the reader may differentiate between a drug consumer and a person buying a gun. The person
who buys a gun shall have the choice to use it, either for purposes which cause a negative externality or for
purposes which may not, whereas, in case of a drug, the consumer would have no control over the impact
of his use of the drug. Nonetheless, it may be pointed out that the consumers can help decelerate the
process of development of resistance by following guidelines and taking antibiotics, antiviral and other
related pharmaceuticals when prescribed by the doctor. See Lewis, supra note 37.
51
It may not be known which drug initiated the cross resistance phenomenon, facilitated within a single
or various species of pathogens, to a particular attack mechanism.
52
See Shavell, supra note 5, at 17 (“. . . general justification for state intervention in sales is to cure a
problem of lack of information on the part of a participant in the sale, in order to effect a type of transaction
more closely in line with what would have been consummated had parties been informed.”).
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An ideal regime in such a case would be one which is able to ensure that maximum
number of people are able to afford drugs before they become useless, and that their
consumption is regulated so as to increase their shelf life. 53 We are of the view that the
scope and duration of protection of such innovations should be reduced. For instance, if
product patents are disallowed or the protection term is reduced from the current norm of
20 years, then such a measure shall ensure the emergence of competitive markets over a
shorter period of time and would make it difficult for firms to charge supracompetitive
prices. 54 As a consequence, a greater number of people would be able to use the drug
before the disease causing pathogens are able to develop resistance to the medicine. 55
This would offset the cost imposed upon the society by such innovations and reduce the
deadweight loss in the society by increasing the access to an innovation. 56
¶17
Such a measure would also ensure that the incentive for the enterprises/firms to
research and develop such drugs reduces. This in turn would make investment in other
forms of antimicrobials relatively more attractive,57 and consequently, result in resources
being channeled into exploring other alternatives, for instance, drugs which satisfy our
interpretation of Locke’s second condition. 58 Hence, instead of making the producer or
See Lewis, supra note 37; see also Union of Concerned Scientists, FDA’s Approach to Antibiotic
Regulation—“The Framework Document”,
http://www.ucsusa.org/food_and_environment/antibiotics_and_food/fdas-approach-to-antibioticregulation.html (last visited May 19, 2008).
54
This is evident from, for instance, after an Indian pharmaceutical firm called Cipla, introduced a
generic three-drug AIDS therapy at an annual cost of $350 in Africa which was 1/30th of the US price of
the drugs, global pharmaceutical firms such as Bristol-Myers and Merck had to accordingly reduce their
prices. See Cipla Sees Exports of AIDS Drugs Increase Following Discount Offer,
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/Daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?DR_ID=6792 (last visted May 19, 2008); see
also Donald G. McNeil, Jr., New List of Safe AIDS Drugs, Despite Industry Lobby, N.Y TIMES, March 21,
2002, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0CE6D91038F932A15750C0A9649C8B63&sec=&spo
n=&pagewanted=all.
55
See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO MEDICINES STRATEGY: FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION IN
ESSENTIAL DRUGS AND MEDICINES POLICY 2000-2003 7 (2000) (suggesting that nearly one third of the
world’s population lacks access to essential medicines.); see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research 280 SCIENCE, 698,
698 (May 1998); Implications of the TRIPs Agreement for Developing Countries,
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/trips/tripsmaintexttrans-04.htm (last visited May, 19, 2008); B.
Chirac, et al., Access to Essential Medicines in Poor Countries: a Lost Battle?, 281 JAMA 362 (1999).
Nonetheless, we concede that such a measure may be counter productive since reduction of scope and
duration of intellectual property in antibiotics, antivirals and other related pharmaceuticals would reduce
the incentive for pharmaceutical firms to invest in development of such drugs. Therefore, such a step
should not be introduced if the expected benefit from increased protection of such innovations is greater
than the excepted cost due to the consequent evolution of resistant pathogens and the deadweight caused as
a consequence of the increased protection.
56
The reduction in the scope and duration in the intellectual property regime can be seen as a
compensatory measure. See sources cited, supra note 44.
57
For instance, if the scope and duration of protection for a certain category of drugs is increased, it is
rational to presume, all other things remaining equal that investment in research and development of that
category of drugs would increase.
58
University Of California, Los Angeles, ‘Smart Antibiotics’ May Result From UCLA Research,
(September 23, 2004) SCIENCE DAILY, available at
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2004/09/040923093007.htm. The article reports the discovery of
certain antimicrobial agents which can be used as an inexhaustible resource to treat diseases caused by
microbes. (Wherein, Jeffery F. Miller, professor and chair of microbiology, immunology and molecular
genetics at UCLA states, “A problem with antibiotics is that bacteria can mutate and become resistant to a
particular antibiotic, while the antibiotic is static and cannot change . . . . Bacteriophages (“phages”) are
53
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consumer solely liable, perhaps applying a weaker IP regime as opposed to the current
regime and laying down of global norms regarding drug consumption for consumers, 59
would be a step in the right direction.

nature’s anti-microbials, and they are amazingly dynamic. If the bacterium mutates in an effort to evade,
the bacteriophage can change its specificity using the mechanism we discovered, to kill the newly resistant
bacterium.” Also that, “Phage therapy has been practiced for nearly a hundred years in parts of the world,
and even in the United States in the first half of the 20th century. But now, we think we can engineer
bacteriophages to function as ‘dynamic’ anti-microbial agents. This could provide us with a renewable
resource of smart antibiotics for treating bacterial diseases.”)
59
See sources cited and discussion, supra note 55. Here we seek to draw a parallel with the argument
that strict liability with contributory negligence can lead to socially optimal outcomes. See Shavell, supra
note 5, Ch. 10, at 16.
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